The Web 2.0, GRID applications and, more recently, semantic desktop applications are bringing the Web to a situation where more and more data and metadata are shared and made available to large user groups. In this context, metadata may be tags or complex graph structures such as file system or web directories, or (lightweight) ontologies. In turn, users can themselves be tagged by certain properties, and can be organized in complex directory structures, very much in the same way as data. Things are further complicated by the highly unpredictable and autonomous dynamics of data, users, permissions and access control rules. In this paper we propose a new access control model and a logic, called RelBAC (for Relation Based Access Control) which allows us to deal with this novel scenario. The key idea, which differentiates RelBAC from the state of the art, e.g., Role Based Access Control (RBAC), is that permissions are modeled as relations between users and data, while access control rules are their instantiations on specific sets of users and objects. As such, access control rules are assigned an arity which allows a fine tuning of which users can access which data, and can evolve independently, according to the desires of the policy manager(s). Furthermore, the formalization of the RelBAC model as an EntityRelationship (ER) model allows for its direct translation into Description Logics (DL). In turn, this allows us to reason, possibly at run time, about access control policies.
Introduction
Web service applications, GRID applications, the Web 2.0 and Social Web applications, e.g., FaceBook, MySpace, and more recently, semantic desktops (e.g., IRIS [15] , Haystack [14], Nepomuk [16] ) are bringing the Web to a situation where more and more user data and metadata are made available for sharing. In this context metadata may be tags, attributes of files, or complex graph structures such as file system or web directories, or (lightweight) ontologies. In turn, users (actually user descriptions) can themselves be tagged by certain properties, they can be organized in groups, e.g., as the friends of a person, or as those people who are interested in a specific topic, e.g., "Peace in the Middle East", or in the results of a specific scientific experiment. Groups themselves can build complex graph structures (e.g., lightweight people ontologies written in FOAF), often across and independently of organizational boundaries, and also independently of how data and metadata are organized. This situation is further complicated by the high unpredictable dynamics where data, users, and access permissions change independently.
This new scenario presents a set of characteristics which make it radically different from previous applications, e.g., Intranet applications, in particular:
• Data and users are organized in complex structures; typically hierarchical structures, i.e., direct acyclic graphs (DAGs) plus constraints and complex links among user groups and data. Permissions themselves are organized in DAGs, needed to take into account, among other things, the time-variance of the application context [19, 18] . Thus, as an example, one would like to distinguish in a uniform way (and to reason about it, see item below) about Read, Read during the week-end, and Read at night.
• Permissions, and access control policies evolve autonomously from data and users. This requires treating them as first class objects. As a consequence, it must be possible to add, delete or change a permission or a rule independently from users and data (differently from what happens in Role Based Access Control (RBAC) [7] ). Furthermore a much more refined control on the arity of access control rules must be enforced. In particular, it must be possible to say that, e.g., m users in a pre-existing group can access n data in a pre-existing class.
• Systems are inherently open and it is impossible to know, at design time, the future evolution of data, metadata, users, user groups and the consequent access control mechanisms. Data, metadata, users and user groups are subject to strong unpredictable dynamics. This requires complex reasoning about policies, at run time, while the system is in operation.
In this paper we propose a new access control model and a logic, called RelBAC (for Relation Based Access Control) which allows us to deal with this novel scenario. The key idea, which differentiates the RelBAC model from the state of the art, is that permissions are modeled as relations between users (called subjects in access control terminology) and data (also called objects) while access control rules are their instantiations, with arity, on specific sets of users and objects. We define the RelBac model as an Entity Relationship (ER) model [3] thus defining permissions as relations between classes of subjects and classes of objects. Finally, and this is the last component of our approach, by exploiting the well known translation of ER diagrams into Description Logics (DL) [1] we define a (Description) logic, called the RelBAC Logic, which allows us to express and reason about users, objects, permissions, access control rules and policies. In turn, this allows us to reason about policies by using state of the art, off-the-shelf, DL Reasoners, e.g., Pellet [17] . Thus, for instance the permission Use can be modelled as a binary relation which holds for all the pairs (subj, obj) where the subject subj can Use the object obj, while Student ∃U se.P C is an access control rule (written in DL) which states that all students should have access to at least one PC among all the PCs which are available. Furthermore the policy consisting of the above control rule plus the rule Student ≤ 1U se.P C states that students can use one and most one PC among all PCs which are available to them. Notice that the above policy states that in different times the same student is allowed to use different PCs.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the RelBAC model. Section 3 introduces the RelBAC logic in all its articulations, and in particular it describes how to define complex sets of users, objects and permissions, and how to define hierarchies, and (general and ground) policies. This section also describes how to represent in RelBAC the most common type of policies used so far in access control. Section 4 is an early discussion about RelBAC, how to use it in practice, about its underlying ideas and of how it compares with the existing frameworks. And Section 5 provides some conclusions. 
The RelBAC Model
We represent the RelBAC Model with the ER Diagram in Figure 1 . Let us analyze its components in detail. SUBJECT (or USER): a set of subjects, namely the set of those users who can perform operations on objects; GROUP: any subset, or group, or community of users; OBJECT: a set of all objects, namely the set of all data (and/ or resources) on which users can perform operations; CLASS: any subset, or class of objects; IS-A 1 on SUBJECT, GROUP, OBJECT, CLASS: as from Figure 1 , SUBJECT and OBJECT can have many subsets, in a one-to-many relationship while GROUP and CLASS, being in a many-to-many ISA hierarchy with themselves, form a Direct Acyclic Graph (a DAG). This part of the model is what allows us to capture the fact that data and users can be organized in arbitrarily complex hierarchies; PERMISSION: the intuition is that a PERMISSION is an operation that users can perform on objects. To capture this intuition a PERMISSION is named with the name of the operation it refers to, e.g., Write, Read operation or some more high level operation, e.g., CanSign. According to the ER diagram in Figure 1 , a PERMISSION is a relation between GROUP and CLASS. This is a first level of flexibility in the definition of access control policies: users and data evolve and, a posteriori, we can add, delete or modify a permission (on the current sets of users and data); IS-A on the aggregation of SUBJECT, PERMISSION and OBJECT: PERMISSIONS can be hierarchically organized in a many-to-many relation and form a DAG. This captures the intuition that the permission to perform a certain operation may imply the permission of performing another, intuitively weaker, operation. As a simple example, a Write permission may imply a Read permission, which mathemat- ically means that all the subject/ object pairs in Write are also in Read, but not necessarily vice versa.
(ACCESS CONTROL)RULE: the intuition is that an ACCESS CONTROL RULE, or simply a RULE, associated to a PERMISSION is the instantiation of PERMISSION to a specific set of users and a specific set of objects. We have two possible types of RULEs. A user-centric RULE is defined by saying that a specific set of users is a subset (or a superset or the set) of all subjects which can apply a certain operation to a specific set of objects. Dually, an object-centric RULE is defined by saying that a specific set of objects is a subset (or a superset or the set) of all objects which can be applied a certain operation by a specific set of users. Access control rules have an arity. Thus a RULE may be manyto-many. one-to-many, zero-to-many, or of some other arity. In Figure 1 we have represented the case many-to-many just to represent the most powerful relation. POLICY: policies (not represented in the diagram) are sets of access control rules.
As an example of RelBAC model, consider the situation in Figure 2 where Rui is a person who has on his PC a directory of contacts (on the left) which represents his social network and a file system (on the right) which contains various items including code, publications and entertainment material. In Figure 2 , nodes with mark '+' represent a set (of people, of data), while nodes with mark 'i' represent a single entity (a person or a file). Thus, for instance, as from the picture, Rui has a colleague Hao, who's a coder in KnowDive research group. Rui has also another colleague, Ilya, who's a manager in the group; he has some friends who are soccer fans, some of which like the team AC Milan while some others like Juventus (another Italian team). He also has some close friends classified in his social network.
Consider now Figure 3 . Permissions form a complex hierarchical structure. Similarly to Figure 2 '+' represent sets (of subject/ object pairs), while nodes with mark 'i' represent single subject/ object pairs. Figure 3 a states that the Read permission is more general that the Write and Delete permissions, in other words, that having a Write or a Delete permission implies having also a Read permission. It also states (last item) that Hao can Read Shrek II, without necessarily being able to Write or Delete it. Figure 3 -b shows how it is possible to represent contextual factors as direct conditions in a hierarchy. It states, for instance, that the users who can connect on weekdays are are a subset of those who can have some connect capability, and the same for those who can connect on weekends. Notice that in this hierarchy the root Connect is less general than its descendants and so on for all nodes and paths. In particular the people that will always be able to Connect will be a subset of those who will be able to Connect on week days or on weekends. The two hierarchies in Figure 3 have therefore opposite polarity, starting respectively from the relation with the largest and the smallest extension. The arrows, by going from the largest to the smallest relation, represent just this fact.
The RelBAC Logic
The possibility to translate ER diagrams into Description Logics allows for a direct formalization of the RelBAC model into a family of logics for access control, that we also call RelBAC. This is a family of logics, rather than a single logic as different policies correspond to different logics, each with its own expressiveness and computational properties (see [1] for a survey on DL). 2 This formalization is quite natural and is done by modeling Subjects (Users) and Objects as Concepts (whose interpretations are, respectively, sets of subjects and objects) and permissions as DL Roles (whose interpretations are binary relations between sets of subjects and sets of objects).
In the following of this section we describe how it is possible to define user groups, object classes and permissions (Section 3.1), we show how it is possible to build hierarchies of users, objects and permissions (Section 3.2), and then show how to formalize general access control rules (Section 3.3) and instance specific access control rules (Section 3.4). Finally we conclude this section by showing how it is possible to formalize in RelBAC the type of access control rules used in RBAC ) (Section 3.5).
From a logical point of view most of the contents of the following subsections are just a re-statement of the very well known DL language and semantics. The added value is the re-interpretation of DL concepts in access control terms and the evidence that this paper provides of how natural this interpretation is.
Defining Users, Objects, Permissions
Sets of users and objects are formalized as atomic concepts. Permissions are formalized as DL roles (not to be confused with the RBAC roles!):
where U i (i = 1, ..., m) are concepts for users, such as F riend or KnowDive; O j (j = 1, ..., n) are concepts for objects, such as V ideo or Code; P k (k = 1, ..., s) are roles for permissions defining user-object pairs. Examples of permissions are conventional file operations such as Read and W rite or some other field functions such as Cash and Audit. U ser and Object are the concepts for all users and objects, respectively. From now on, we use italic starting with a Capital letter as concept and role names.
RelBAC provides the possibility to define complex groups of users, complex classes of objects and complex relations in terms of the basic sets U ser, Object, U i , O i and permissions P i defined above. The RelBAC formation rules are:
A full description of the above constructs is out of the goals of this paper; the reader can refer to any standard book on DL. Let us only make a few general observations. The first is that assertions about users, objects and permissions are embedded in a full propositional language which allows to perform (propositional) reasoning (about policies) (the two distinct items on negation have been kept, even if the second implies the first, as they have very different expressibility and complexity properties). The second is that we have a set of quantificational constructs (i.e., ∀, ∃ but also ≥ nP , ≤ nP ) (whose meaning will be made precise below) which allow to express the arity of relations. The third and last is that we can negate permissions where, e.g., ¬Read is the set of all pairs where a user cannot read an object, and that we can also take the inverse of a relation where, e.g., Read is the set of all pairs where the object can be read by the user.
The above intuitions can be made precise by using the standard DL semantics as follows. We start with the defintion of Interpretation for the language defined above. An Interpretation consists of an Interpretation Function I and a non empty set ∆ I (the Domain of Interpretation we interpret a permission P k as a binary relation P I k ⊆ U ser I × Object I . If we consider, for instance, the hierarchy in Figure 3 we have that (Hao I , Shrek II I ) ∈ Read I . Notice that in general, we use italic words that begin with lower case letter as instance names, with exceptions.
We can now define the semantics of the above constructs as follows:
where '| · |' denotes the cardinality of a set, n ranges over nonnegative integers. Let us consider in detail the quantificational constructs. We have that, e.g., ∀Read.V ideo denotes the set of all users who can read (see) only videos, while ∃Read. denotes the set of who can read (in Figure  3 , something in Rui's Semantic Desktop), ∃Read.V ideo denotes the set of who can read (see) at least a video, ≥ 3Read.V ideo and ≤ 3Read.V ideo denote the set of those who can, respectively, read (see) at least or at most three videos. The most important observation is that the above constructs not only allow to define complex sets of users out of the basic ones, e.g. V ideo M usic but, through the quantifiers, they also allow to define sets with the desired arity. As the following will make clear, this is the basis on which access control rules are defined. rs, they also allow to define sets with the desired arity. As the following will make clear, this is the basis on which access control rules are defined.
Defining Hierarchies of users, objects and permissions
In RelBAC, we declare hierarchies as subsumption axioms, namely as axions of the form (we limit ourselves only to one direction of subsumption, dual arguments hold for the other direction):
where A i , A j can be users, objects or permissions. Thus for instance, some paths in the hierarchies in Figures 2, 3 Figure 1 as the IS-A relation on SUBJECT and GROUP) is formalized as Figure 1 as the IS-A relation on OBJECT and CLASS) is formalized as Figure 1 as the IS-A relation on the aggregation of PERMISSION, SUBJECT and OBJECT) is formalized as P 1 ≥ P 2 if f P 1 P 2 Notice that the direction of the partial order is opposite to that of subsumption; namely the smaller a set is, the higher it is in the partial order. ≥ has been defined, for users in particular, to mimic the RBAC partial order on roles. The intuition is that the larger sets of users will have less permissions, and the same for objects. Dually, the partial order on permissions follows that: the more powerful permission the higher in the partial order. The overall intuition is that sets of users and objects which are smaller and therefore higher in their partial order are those involved in the more powerful permissions.
Defining General Access Control Rules
Access control rules may take one of the following three forms C ≡ D C D C D where: C ≡ D, to be read as "C is equivalent to D", is interpreted as C I = D I , C is either a group of users or a group of objects, and D can be any formula constructed following the syntax in Section 3.1. Equivalence should be used with a lot of attention and limited to those cases which are self-evident (e.g., synonyms) such as ICT Student ≡ ICT P eople Student. Rules usually take the form of subsumption formulas. In the following we will consider only one direction of subsumption; dual arguments apply for the other direction. A first set of paradigmatic examples can be defined as formula (1-4): As it can be easily noticed from the examples above, and as also represented in the ER model in Figure 1 , there are two kinds of access control rules 1. User-centric access control rules (e.g., Rule (1)), namely rules which define which users can perform an operation P on a certain set of objects.
2. Object-centric access control rules (e.g., Rule (2)), namely rules which define which objects can be applied a certain operation P −1 by a certain set of users.
In the above notation we have assumed that all permissions are defined from subjects to objects and therefore all objectcentric rules are defined in terms on inverse permissions. Of course, in practice, the policy manager is free to define permissions as she wants.
Defining Ground Access Control Rules
Most often one would like to define Ground Access Control Rules (and policies), that we also sometimes call Rules involving Instances, namely statements about permissions of specific users and/or objects. In turn ground rules may involve individuals or sets of individuals.
Rules involving individuals (users of objects) can take one of two forms as group/class assignment and permission assignment. (the cases not considered are analogous).
And intended (formal) semantics are clear in access control domain that the first associates a user/object to a group/class while the second assigns a permission to a specific user and a specific object. Inversion of permission can be assigned to (o, u) pair similarly. We have the following examples:
1. KnowDive(Rui) declares Rui to be a member of the group KnowDive.
V ideo(Shrek II)
states that the file Shrek II is a video.
3. Download(Hao, Shrek II) states that Hao can download Shrek II.
To define ground rules about sets of individuals we need some notation for sets and for computing the domain of a permission. We have the following: {a 1 , . . . , a 2 } | (set constructor)
where a i can be a user or an object and the membership constructor is the composition of the fill constructor and the user assignment constructor, with the following semantics (the cases with the inverse permission are analogous):
Notice that the fill constructor P : o defines all users u which have permission P on object o while the membership constructor states that the user u has permission P on the object o. The above definitions allow us to define ground rules as formula (9-14): Policies can be symmetrically stated for objects using inverse permissions, thus obtaining the formula (15-20).
Defining the Total Access Control Rule
The usual practice in access control, and specifically in RBAC, is to construct policies as follows. First Roles are defined as sets of permissions P over a specific set of objects O; let us call this set, P (O). Then P (O) is assigned to individual users u or sets of users U . This assignment is total in the sense that all the users in U , or u herself in the case of single user, can apply each permission in P to all objects in O. We call this the Total Access Control (TAC) rule. The TAC rule can be defined as the following RelBAC ground policy:
{P (u 1 , o 1 ) , . . . , P (u 1 , o m ) , . . . , P (u n , o m )}. In other words the TAC rule is defined as the set of all ground access control rules P (u i , o j ) for all users u i ∈ U and objects o j ∈ O.
A more elegant formulation defines the TAC rule as a policy which does not need to enumerate all instances. The DL formula for the TAC rule has been constructed by Alex Borgida and is defined as follows:
∀O.P ≡ ∀¬P.¬O We have in fact that
We can therefore define a TAC general policy using one of the following DL formulas: are equivalent in the sense that they define exactly the same set of policies. This is due to the fact that the TAC rule (and its strong request to be able to access all objects) plus the equivalence relation break the asymmetry intrinsic in subsumption and in user versus object centric access control policies (on this last item see below Section 4.3).
As a follow-up on the last observation, it can be noticed that the RelBAC TAC rule which does exactly the same as the rules used in RBAC is defined as formula (25) or, from above, equivalently as formula (26), but read Section 4.2 on the use of equivalences in the definition of access control rules.
Using RelBAC
How should we use RelBAC in practice? Isn't RelBAC just the (n+1) Logic for access control? More precisely, how can we use the added expressibility of RelBAC policies? This is still too early to judge and a lot of work has to be done in order to provide an answer to this question and, ultimately, to judge the real usefulness of RelBAC. However a few comments and observations can already be done. Let us analyze them in some detail.
Quantifiers in policies?
The first observation is concerned with the role of quantifiers. Why should they be used at all? They have been very successfully used in data bases, but in access control they are completely avoided as policies are implicitly universally quantified (see Section 3.5). Do we really need them? Maybe access control relations do not need the level of expressibility needed in data bases and information systems.
Let us consider, as an example, the following rule Student ∃U se.P C which states that students should be able to use at least one PC. We are stating that any student in principle could use all PCs (as in the TAC rule) but that what really matters is that she has access to one. And the above policy could be made stronger, using number restrictions, by saying that a student should have access to exactly one PC or, using the universal quantifier, by saying that students can use only PCs and that therefore, e.g., they cannot use personal assistants.
Of course the same effect can be obtained in the existing systems, e.g., RBAC, by checking these constraints at run time. But in this case this constraint would be embedded in the code and it would be impossible to reason about it. Notice that ER diagrams have been invented just for providing high level semi-formal specifications of information systems and Description Logics have been defined in order to perform automated reasoning about their properties. Maybe, in the past, there was no much need of high level specifications of the kind allowed by ER diagrams and even less of reasoning about them. But the increasing number of open, dynamically evolving systems, with strong access control requirements, which are among the main motivations for this work, seem to lead in this direction.
Subsumption policies?
In state of the art access control systems, policies are stated as equivalences. In other words, in any moment in time, a given set of users is given exactly a set of permissions on a precisely defined set of objects. In RelBAC we have suggested to minimize equivalences and to concentrate instead on subsumption policies (Section 3.3). This suggestion is a consequence of the past experience which has shown that stating properties (in our case policies) as equivalences leads into specifications which are too rigid, hard to maintain and that can easily create difficulties (e.g., generate an inconsistent set of policies). And this is more and more true the more complex systems are, and the more dynamics there are (with the need, each time a policy is changed, to check that all desired properties are satisfied).
Consider for instance the following access control rule: Student ≡ ∃U se.P C. Suppose that, by chance, it happens that students may also use a palmar. One would like to add the following policy Student ∃U se.P almar but this would lead an inconsistent theory (under the assumption that palmars are different objects from PCs), while this would have not been the case if we had used the corresponding subsumption policy, as written in the previous subsection. Dually, it is possible to assert the following rule Student ∃U se.HP C where HP C is an acronym for High performance Computer, and add later further policies which restrict the extension of Student just to the correct set of students.
Again, as in the previous subsection, similar effects could be obtained programmatically by dynamically controlling the extensions of the relevant sets of users and objects but, again, this would make it impossible to reason about them at the policy level. The further (usual) advantage of stating a policy in a logical specification, instead of embedding it into the code, is that it can be (easily) changed, contrarily to the latter case where the policy is hardwired in the system code.
User and Object centric policies
Prior to the success of RBAC and the most recent access models for access control, this task was done by using Access Control Matrix [2] . A main advantage of this approach was that the Access Control Matrix could be analyzed by rows or by columns. By looking at the rows one would take the users' perspective and analyze their capabilities, by looking at the columns and one would take the objects' perspective and analyze their access control lists. One main problem was scalability: in large applications the large number of subject/ object pairs, most of which were irrelevant, made this approach unfeasible in practice. RBAC solved this problem by splitting subjects from objects via roles. This however leads to a user centric view of policies where the key component is the definition of RBAC user roles.
Instead, RelBAC splits subjects from objects by defining permissions as relations. As the previous sections make clear, the role of users and objects is completely symmetric and one can symmetrically define user-centric or objectcentric policies. In practice, the policy admnistrator can look at (our version of) capabilities or at (our version of) access control lists. It is important to notice that in the Web we find more and more applications, e.g., Wikipedia, various content portals, where the space of users is quite flat (i.e., most of the users are undistinguished users, often anonymous, which navigate the Web) while data form a huge space of valuable content whose access needs to be put more and more in control (think of instance of the sensitive topics, e.g., sex).
Scalability
But, will RelBAC scale in practice? This issue is fundamental not only because the current state of the art, e.g., RBAC, has been vey successful on this issue, but also because the new full connectivity scenarios are bringing us to applications where the size of users and data is far beyond the existing applications.
The answer to this question must be split in two parts: ground policies and general policies.
Let us consider these two issues in turn. According to our first implementation of RelBAC, ground policies in Rel-BAC can be implemented, using, e.g., a relational data base, by using practically the same ideas as RBAC, and with very much the same level of efficiency. In practice the triples S, O, P implementing RelBAC access control rules can be implemented as pairs S, P (O) , very much in the same way as the rules used in RBAC. Also the RelBAC policy maintenance problem is basically the same and the system administrator can be provided an interface which looks very much the same as in RBAC.
Things change radically at the level of general policies. Here there are many concurrent issues. The first is the number of policies. On this issue things look promising. In fact even if RelBAC policies are inherently more expressive, they extend naturally one of the fundamental features which made RBAC very successful, i.e, the hierarchy on roles and the propagation of permissions, to users, objects and permissions (see Section 3.3), which in turn leads to the possibility of generation in RelBAC of what we could call Hierarchical Policies. Consider for instance a rule of form (1) from Section 3.3 (the same argument applies also to all the other policies):
U 1 ∃P 1 .O 1 . This policy also implies the following set of policies U 2 ∃P 2 .O 2 . for any U 2 such that U 2 ≥ U 1 , for any O 2 such that O 1 ≥ O 2 , and for any P 2 such that P 1 ≥ P 2 . In other words, the number of subsumption policies can be mini-mized by taking the biggest possible group of users, the smallest possible set of objects and the most powerful permission. All policies involving any subgroup, any superset of objects and any less powerful policy are automatically implied. As a simple example based on the hierarchies in Figures 2,3 , consider the following policy Knowdive ∃U pdate.V ideo This policy implies that all Coders and Managers not only can U pdate but they can also Delete and Read some of the material on Rui's Semantic Desktop.
As a second example, the following (equivalence version of the) TAC rule Knowdive ≡ ∀V ideo.U pdate states that all the people in the KnowDive group and therefore all Coders and Managers not only can U pdate but they can also Delete and Read all Videos on Rui's Semantic Desktop and nothing more.
Furthermore, in our first implementation of RelBAC, we have implemented user and object directories as Lightweight Ontologies [4] (also called Formal Classifications [12, 13] ) and performed some preliminary evaluations of the possibility of automatically classifying users and objects in directories and of automatic generation of permissions based on the user interests, exploiting the Semantic Matching technology [5, 9, 10, 8, 6, 11] . The results, though preliminary, look very promising; future papers will investigate this venue of research. It must be pointed out that this research line, if successful, will allow us to share access control policies using Web standard languages, e.g., OWL.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed RelBAC a model and a logic for access control designed for open, highly dynamic environments, where users and data are organized in complex graphs (DAGs or more simply directories) and where permissions are handled as first class objects, largely independently from users and objects.
